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In 1943 when the deservedly little-known University of Sydney China scholar, Richard 
Ormsby Martin, published his monograph on Tradition and Transition in Chinese 
Politics, he could little know that for the next eighty years China’s political 
development would remain dominated by the twin themes of tradition and transition.1 
Even after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), politics was no 
more noticeably characterised by stability than it had been when he was writing. The 
excitement of the Great Leap Forward was succeeded by the Sturm und Drang of the 
Cultural Revolution. The first attempts at reform and openness culminated in the 
Tiananmen Square events of June 1989, only to be followed by three decades of 
exceptional economic growth that have significantly altered most aspects of life in 
China. Through this process China’s past has been in constant tension with its future as 
China seeks to negotiate an understanding of where change may lead.  
 
As everyone now knows, General Secretary Hu Jintao thought long and hard before his 
landmark speech at the opening of the 18th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) in October 2012. He was about to announce the Political Bureau’s decision to 
hold open direct national elections. It would be fair to say that this speech came as 
                                                 
1 Ormsby Martin (1901-1987) was on the staff of the University of Sydney in various capacities from the 
start of the Second World War until the early 1970s. In the early 1940s he was an Acting Lecturer in the 
Department of History. His other book was a translation of poetry, Shan Shui: Translations of Chinese 
Landscape Poetry (1946). 
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something of a surprise to the rest of the world and particularly to political scientists 
outside China, given that the leadership of the CCP remained united and faced no state 
crisis, and that there had been no significant increase in mass unrest.2  
 
In the full glare of the world’s press and television Hu turned to Deng Xiaoping Theory, 
quoting his boyhood hero from Deng’s days in establishing a border region government 
in the Taihang Mountains in 1941. Then Deng had proposed an elected border region 
assembly as an extension of the program to encourage political participation through 
elections. War-time conditions had made direct elections impossible so the assembly 
only became a Provisional Assembly when elected in 1941. Hu reminded his audience 
that direct elections were postponed only until the second half of 1944, with the directly 
elected border region assembly eventually meeting in March 1945.  
 
Hu Jintao proceeded to quote Deng Xiaoping’s precise words:  
 
We Communists always oppose a one-party dictatorship … The CCP certainly doesn’t have a 
program to monopolise government because one party can only rule in its own interests and 
won’t act according to the Will of the People. Moreover, it goes against democratic politics. 
(Deng 1941) 
 
Hu acknowledged that sometimes, as Mao Zedong had said, ‘Political power grows out 
of the barrel of a gun.’3 At the same time, he reminded his audience that elections had 
always been, and remained, an essential part of the political system introduced by the 
CCP. Without elections, Hu emphasised, quoting the discussions at the 3rd Plenum of 
the 11th Central Committee of the CCP and its Central Work Conference in December 
1978, come the kinds of abuses of power such as occurred during the Cultural 
Revolution. These can only be prevented if ‘the masses become the real masters of the 
country’ and ‘the people elect government leaders of their own choice’ (People’s Daily 
1978). Hu also quoted Chen Yun’s speech at the same Central Work Conference: ‘Only 
democracy can provide stable norms for political behaviour and ensure the mobilisation 
of popular initiative for economic growth’ (People’s Daily 1979). As a result of the 
changes introduced by the 3rd Plenum, direct elections to the county level of the 
territorial administrative hierarchy were introduced in the middle of 1979 (Goodman 
1985), and village and township elections, as well as those at the county level, had been 
                                                 
2 These are the three simultaneous conditions required for successful regime change in the 20th century 
according to the comprehensive research undertaken by Ted Robert Gurr and Jack Goldstone (1991). 
3 Mao Zedong (1938). Those familiar with Alabama Three will note that the official translation of this 
quote was employed. 
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a major feature of local politics during the previous three decades (He 2007; O’Brien & 
Zhao 2010). 
 
The proposal from the Political Bureau provided for the convening of a Constituent 
Assembly in 2013 to examine and make recommendations on a suitable form of election. 
On the basis of the political reform program that emerged, a number of political parties 
announced that they would compete in the first national general election in 2015. Two 
issues were not capable of resolution at that time—the extent of autonomy in the Tibet 
Autonomous Region; and the possibility of federal reform—and have been submitted to 
referenda at the time of the 2020 election. 
 
The Constituent Assembly 
The Constituent Assembly met in Beijing shortly after Spring Festival in 2013. Its 
members were nominated by the provincial level (including municipalities and 
autonomous region) people’s congresses and political consultative congresses, the 
Chinese Communist Party, organs of the central government and the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA). The major questions scheduled for discussion centred on the 
changes that should be introduced into the political system in order to ensure the 
effectiveness of electoral reform; and the electoral system to be adopted. The choice of 
political system essentially came down to either a Washington model of direct 
presidential government, where the executive would be accountable to, but not part of, 
the legislature, or a Westminster model, where the executive would be part of the 
legislature, and the prime minister would be elected because of majority support in the 
National People’s Congress (NPC). 
 
The CCP favoured a Westminster model on the grounds that presidential elections 
delivered either military leaders (France under De Gaulle), faceless ciphers (Calderón, 
Mexico), or outsiders who rapidly lost support (Obama, USA), and which under all 
circumstances were simply populist beauty-contest type competitions devoid of political 
ideas. In their view, a Westminster model was more democratic because it allowed 
voters more say at a more local level in electing constituency representatives. In contrast 
the minority view held that the Westminster model led to more easily paralysed 
government, especially through coalitions, and that only the presidential model could 
deliver strong and purposive government. 
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When considering the electoral system to be adopted, at one point it appeared that a 
majority of the delegates to the Constituent Assembly favoured a system of absolute 
proportional representation where the number of votes cast nationally would lead to the 
proportion of delegates elected to the NPC. Their initial view was that this was the 
fairest and most democratic system. The CCP successfully argued that this would lead 
to unstable and weak government, where the interests of the minority would be trampled 
underfoot. Far better, they said, to have a UK style ‘first past the post’ voting system in 
single constituencies. This would, they argued, always ensure at least two strong 
political parties in the NPC able to pass legislation and support the work of government.  
 
The CCP pointed to an analysis of the results of the 6 May 2010 General Election in the 
UK demonstrating the effect of different electoral systems on the political outcome to 
prove their point (Table 1).4 The leaders of the CCP dismissed the various opposition 
claims that a first past the post electoral system ensured their political futures as ‘sour 
grapes from those who do not have the national interest at heart.’ As the leaders of the 
CCP frequently argued, in a multi-party system it is necessary to ensure that a political 
party can achieve a majority of power with only 34 percent of the popular vote, as has 
long been the case with the UK electoral system (Johnston et al. 2001; Johnston & 
Pattie 2006: 273).  
 
Party Vote 
(%) 
Seats by Electoral System 
 First Past the 
Post 
Proportional 
Representation 
Alternative 
Vote 
Single 
Transferable 
Vote 
Additional 
Member 
CONSERVATIVE 36 47 36 43 40 42 
LABOUR 29 40 29 40 32 36 
LIBERAL-
DEMOCRAT 
21 10 21 12 25 15 
Table 1: Analysis of Electoral Systems, UK General Election, 6 May 2010. 
 
The Constituent Assembly agreed that direct provincial-level (autonomous regions and 
directly subordinated municipalities as well as provinces) elections should occur at the 
same time as direct national elections. At the same time it could not agree on whether 
                                                 
4 First past the post is the UK system, based on single member constituencies. Proportional 
Representation is a list system for the entire country, as in Israel. Australian elections run on the 
Alternative Vote, in single member constituencies. The single transferable vote is a multi-member 
constituency system practiced in Ireland and Tasmania. Germany has a variety of Additional Member 
system where competitions in single member constituencies are supplemented by deputies elected 
through a list system elected by proportional representation. 
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the Tibet Autonomous Region should be permitted a greater degree of autonomy, as 
some delegates argued; or whether a Federal constitution would be more appropriate, as 
members of the Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League petitioned. Both these 
issues were slated for referenda to be held at the time of the 2020 general election. 
 
The political parties 
One remarkable feature of the party system as it has developed since 2012 is the extent 
to which it has been shaped by organizations that emerged in the late 1940s just before, 
and during, the establishment of the PRC. In that era the CCP recognized a number of 
the other political parties as its partners in a national coalition. These parties all came 
together in the China People’s Political Consultative Conference during the late 1940s, 
and remained active during the PRC, though perhaps more nominally during the 
Cultural Revolution (Seymour 1987). With the exception of the Federation of Peasants 
Parties, and its localised member organisations, these are the only political parties to 
have gained representation in the new electoral environment. In the words of an 
editorial in the People’s Daily: ‘China’s new political party system suits national 
conditions’ (2009).  
 
The various political parties founded outside the PRC during the 1990s and the first 
decade of the 21st century to campaign for change within China (often associated with 
the democracy activists of the late 1980s) disappeared without trace once direct national 
elections were introduced, as did the few established secretly inside the PRC.5 The most 
likely explanation for their failure is their lack of organisational clout compared to the 
more established political parties. Those that were established outside the PRC always 
ran the risk, emphasised by their opponents, of being labelled as ‘outsiders.’ Some 
voters may have felt a degree of resistance to being lectured to by Chinese who had 
chosen to live overseas for more than two decades. Others, particularly younger voters, 
may simply not have recognized the need for, or contribution of, the political exiles. For 
their part, those parties that had been established within the PRC in those years were 
somewhat similarly open to criticism either for being anti-Chinese in their embrace of 
                                                 
5 There were a number of these including the Chinese Democracy and Justice Party; the China 
Democracy Party; the China New Democracy Party; the Party for Freedom and Democracy in China; 
China Green Party; Human Rights Party; and the United Peoples’ Party of China. Two clandestine 
political parties that formed within the PRC were the Union of Chinese Nationalists, and the Chinese 
Nationalist Party (Reformed), though little is known about their activities except their position of 
opposition to the CCP and stated goal of uniting the PRC and Taiwan. 
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ideas and values such as human rights and green politics that could be portrayed as not 
having emerged from China’s experience; or for having regarded the variety of Chinese 
nationalism practiced on Taiwan as somehow superior. 
 
Of the political parties that successfully contested the 2015 national election the largest 
and best organised was the CCP. Active in all provinces, municipalities and 
autonomous regions, it fielded candidates in all 2750 constituencies at the 2015 NPC 
election, and for all sub-national levels of government. It gained 64 percent of the 
popular vote and 83 percent of the seats in the NPC. This was considerably higher than 
the proportion of the CCP elected to the NPC through the previous indirect system, 
where only about 70 percent of the deputies were CCP members.  
 
The CCP carried almost all the provincial-level elections. The exception was Qinghai, 
where the election produced such a complex result that no electorally-produced 
government proved possible despite prolonged negotiations. The political parties that 
contested the election were entirely community-based: six separate Tibetan clan-based 
parties were very unwilling to cooperate with each other, and one Tibetan party opposed 
any form of political system; a political party for the centuries-established Chinese 
community, and another for the more recent (since the early 1950s) migrants; and 
political parties for the Hui, Salar and Tu communities.6 The numbers of those elected 
approximated the proportion of each community in the province’s population, so that no 
potential coalition was able to command a majority. Qinghai has, in consequence, been 
ruled from Beijing since 2015. No election was held in Xinjiang because of concerns 
about community violence; nor was one held in the Tibet Autonomous Region, pending 
the outcome of the 2020 referendum. In general CCP support was stronger in the 
provinces to the North (Friedman 1993), though Shanghai as expected remained the 
company town it had become during the late 1990s (Huang 2008). 
 
The Revolutionary Committee of the Nationalist Party (often referred to as the Left 
Nationalists) won a large number of seats in the post-1949 Nationalist Party (on 
Taiwan) leadership’s former support areas of Jiangsu and Zhejiang, as well as parts of 
Fujian, Guangdong, Shandong, and Shanghai (particularly Kunshan, where it won both 
seats), but in none of those locations did it come close to challenging CCP domination. 
                                                 
6 On the sociopolitical complexity of Qinghai see: Goodman (2004). 
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Its support is significantly higher in areas characterised by inward investment from 
Taiwan.  
 
The China Democratic League campaigned hard in the major cities, and did especially 
well in areas dominated by universities and higher education. It gained a large number 
of votes across the country but despite receiving fifteen percent of the vote, only won 50 
of the seats in the NPC, all in highly urban areas.  
 
Membership of the China Democratic National Construction Association (CDNCA) 
grew substantially in and after 2012. Entrepreneurs who had previously joined the CCP 
as a result of Jiang Zemin’s formulation in 2000 of the ‘Three Represents,’ now left the 
CCP and joined a political organisation they considered more likely to reflect their 
business interests. In 2015 it campaigned hard but only won rural and peri-urban 
constituencies where its businessmen-politicians had enterprises and profile. 
Determined to model itself on the successful examples of the business-oriented 
conservative parties of Europe, the CDNCA has recently turned to the German CDU 
and British Conservative Party for assistance and advice.  
 
The China Association for Promoting Democracy, previously strong among teachers, 
renamed itself as the China Social Democrats and proved surprisingly strong in smaller 
urban centres away from Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing. The China Public 
Dedication Party was, and remains, the political organisation for Overseas Chinese 
(Barabantseva 2005). Unsurprisingly, given the geographic concentration of Overseas 
Chinese and those with long term overseas links, it was particularly successful in the 
2015 election. Its strength is to be found in Guangdong where it gained a third of the 
vote (centred on Chaozhou, Shantou, Taishan, Zhongshan and Zhuhai), and Fujian, 
where support is similarly substantial. In Hainan support is concentrated on the largely 
once Indonesian Overseas Chinese community based in the centre of the island.  
 
The remaining three of the older parties represented in the 2015 NPC had few delegates. 
The Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League was always a small Taiwanese-
speaking political party, and so it remained after 2015, with limited success in those 
parts of South Fujian with which Taiwan has close social and cultural links. Two 
nationally high profile artist members of the September 3 Society were elected to the 
NPC, one each in Hangzhou and Changsha, in constituencies where the local Fine Arts 
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Academy is located. The Chinese Peasants and Workers Democratic Party proved 
electorally ineffectual and was successful in only one constituency in Hubei, where its 
candidate was a local mayor and owner of a flour mill. 
 
The only success outside the ranks of the earlier established parties came from the 
newly established Federation of Peasants Parties (Peasants Federation). This loose 
association of peasant groups and political associations from a variety of provinces 
delivered several hundred delegates to the NPC, and in one or two provinces ran the 
CCP closer than expected. In Hainan, for example, where the mainstream vote was 
largely split between the CCP and the China Democratic National Construction 
Association, with the China Public Dedication Party gaining a further fifteen percent of 
the vote, the Hainan Peasants’ Party found itself within a reasonable statistical distance 
(less than ten percent) of the number of provincial delegates elected for the CCP.7 
 
The prospects for the 2020 election are that the smaller parties may cease to be 
represented in the NPC as party politics become more nationalised. The challenge to the 
CCP essentially comes from the CDNCA and the Peasants Federation, with the Left 
Nationalists, China Democratic League, China Social Democrats and the China Public 
Dedication Party remaining as small political market niche organisations, if each in 
different ways.  
  
Issues of public policy 
A number of public policy issues have become particularly salient since the 2015 
election and these are likely to carry into the election campaign: corruption, which 
remains high in the public consciousness; housing, a significant indicator of class and 
class divisions in politics; and regional development. 
 
Corruption 
One of the problems with public debate on corruption has been the lack of agreement 
about its definition, causes and remedies (Liu 1983: 618; Ma 1989: 40; Rocca 1992: 
402). Everyone knows it exists but there is little agreement on precisely what ‘it’ is. The 
CCP has long seen corruption as a moral problem and so prescribes that its cadres 
should be educated and trained to be virtuous (Goodman 1987). A further significant 
                                                 
7 On the sociopolitics of Hainan see Feng & Goodman (1997). 
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problem is the legacy of the past. Although it is now more than four decades since the 
curtain was brought down on the Cultural Revolution, still many citizens regard 
businessmen and their activities as corrupt. It is a very definite example of a love-hate 
relationship: people are generally fascinated by the life styles of the rich and famous and 
attracted by their wealth; at the same time businessmen and entrepreneurs have 
exceptionally low status and their wealth is seen generally in zero-sum terms as 
someone else’s poverty, and for this reason not just undesirable but corrupt (Zang 2008).  
 
Public perception of corruption focuses to a large extent on the relationship between 
government and business (Ting 2006). The problem though for government, the CCP 
and indeed to some extent all politicians is that not all relationships between 
government and business are corrupt. While government (and to date the CCP) has 
attempted to ensure its cadres do not act corruptly, it also has to educate the electorate in 
this respect. Paradoxically, executing a few leading cadres occasionally may actually 
encourage others to either be less greedy or not to act corruptly, but at the same time it 
does little to convince citizens that there is less corruption or that the government is 
under control. 
 
Simply put corruption might be regarded as the private use of public resources, or the 
engagement in actions knowing them to be either socially or legally unacceptable. There 
is, however, always a problem of boundary maintenance. Social acceptability may be 
highly relative, as is legal practice. Moreover, the circumstances under which corruption 
becomes a focus of public concern are always highly politicised and raise questions 
about who controls the forum and methods of public debate and concern. In Chongqing, 
for example, in and after 2007 the new CCP leader Bo Xilai (son of former Political 
Bureau member Bo Yibo) committed himself and the local CCP to fighting organized 
crime and to the related ‘weeding out of local corruption,’ claiming it had deep social 
roots, which presumably had gone undetected for some considerable time. This 
campaign then became a cause célèbre propelling the CCP leader in question to further 
national prominence. There was even speculation that the campaign represented his bid 
to become General Secretary of the CCP in the next round of leadership succession 
(Cara 2010; Dyer 2010).  
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Still there is no doubt that corruption exists and that it is a matter of public concern. 
There will be candidates who campaign in some areas on specific anti-corruption 
platforms, and a few are likely to be elected if the experience of elections elsewhere is 
any guide. Although corruption is not a programmatic issue it is more likely to damage 
the CCP than any other party, simply because it has been in government for so long and 
exclusively. Unfortunately for the CDNCA and its attempt to turn itself into a Eurostyle 
conservative party, the issue may also have some negative impact on its success, 
because of its inherent links with the business world. Populist parties, such as the 
Peasants Federation, always benefit more from debates on corruption. 
 
Housing 
Housing has become increasingly a marker of social division since the emergence of a 
significant private housing market in the 1990s, and one which has considerable 
potential for class conflict even if mediated through electoral politics. Two trends have 
occurred simultaneously. One has been the demise of the social unit as a provider of 
community and social service, including housing (Bray 2005). Before the Reform Era 
all government organisations, educational institutions, and economic enterprises 
provided housing (and other services) to their staff. The neoliberalist turn has 
introduced greater economic efficiency into resource management at all levels and in all 
sectors (Lee & Zhu 2006). One consequence is that previously work-supplied housing 
has been turned into private housing that is rented or sold on a housing market. The 
second trend has been the development of new gated community housing estates 
(Tomba 2004). The evidence is that this has become an almost inalienable principle of 
urban planning perhaps, at least partially, for reasons of social control. Almost all of 
these new housing estates are gated regardless of status, though there are clearly class 
and income differences in access to specific gated communities (Tomba 2005).  
 
Before the 1990s housing already was a marker of social distinction with better public 
supplied housing being much appreciated. In the past, however, housing quality was 
essentially a function of career and appointment, and less under the individual’s control. 
Differences in quality were also less visible, as well as probably less in absolute terms. 
Housing reform, the growth of an entrepreneurial class with greater real disposable 
income, and the inevitable development of a luxury housing market, has made housing 
differences both highly visible and also matters of public debate. The development of 
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European ‘national villages’ in Songjiang, in Shanghai’s southern suburbs, is a good 
case in point. At the start of the 21st century the Shanghai authorities decided to invite 
architects and planners from a number of different European countries—England, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Germany—to build housing estates representative of their architecture. 
The Italian architect built an estate of ‘Tuscan villas.’ The English architects designed 
‘Thames Town,’ with buildings and streetscapes drawn from London and various parts 
of the UK, including a Whitby public house, an Anglican church, and a copy of the 
Thames near Battersea Bridge complete with bridge. When Thames Town was built in 
2005-2006 the entry price was approximately 5000 yuan per square metre. In 2006 
average GDP per capita in urban China was 11,759 yuan per annum and average rural 
GDP per capita was 3,597 yuan per annum (Xinhua News Agency 2007).  
 
Issues of debate are somewhat surprisingly not about the right to conspicuous 
consumption but about land use in development, equity of access, and questions of 
community self-government. Land use has become a major issue in some areas as 
previously agricultural land is rezoned for housing development, and then effectively 
compulsorily purchased by local government either for development or for onward sales 
to developers (Hsing 2006). In the 2015 elections the various parts of the Peasants 
Federation campaigned solidly behind a program of equitable treatment for peasants 
whose families had farmed land for centuries, only to see it disappearing in new housing 
developments. Interestingly, an analysis of the election results shows that anticipation 
was more electorally potent than when such fears were actually realised. Communities 
that had actually experienced what had been seen as land confiscations were less likely 
to still be around and so were less able to be mobilised by the Peasants Federation than 
peasants in peri-urban areas who felt threatened. It was in those areas that the Peasants 
Federation did exceptionally well in the elections. 
 
Equity of access to new housing estates has become an issue of public debate in some 
cities, particularly large cities (though not mega-cities) such as Shenyang and Taiyuan. 
And where public resources may be seen to be, or may have been, in some sense 
involved in an essentially private housing development, the argument can be made that 
some of the housing made available in this way should be subsidised either by local 
government or the developer to enable the less wealthy to participate (Tomba & Tang 
2008). Interestingly this pressure for equity in new housing developments appears to 
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have been limited to the rust, iron and coal belts of North and Northeast China. Here the 
CCP itself has campaigned for equity of access in nominally joint private-public 
housing developments, and to have built at least part of its support base this way. 
 
The development of gated communities has led to concerns of control by some of the 
residents’ groups. Residents are always asked to pay for security and other community 
services. At the same time, for both political and economic reasons, local governments 
will not surrender their involvement in, or oversight of, some community functions. 
Clearly where local government has been centrally involved in the development of new 
housing communities, it will retain an interest in their operation. Equally this is likely to 
be a point of tension between residents and local government. The CDNCA has been 
particularly active in mobilising support from residents in new housing estates, and not 
just those that cater for the very wealthiest.  
 
Regional development 
Regional development is probably the most important and longest established public 
policy arena in China. There are essentially two separate matters of debate. One is the 
rural-urban divide (Christiansen 1990; Chan 1994; Cheng & Selden 1994; Chan & 
Zhang 1999). The other is the question of severe spatial inequality across China, 
highlighted by Hu Angang and Wang Shaoguang in their reports to the State Council 
during the 1990s.8 While the Peasants Federation is keen to play a central public policy 
role in the former debate, the latter debate is dominated by a perdictable coalition of the 
old left and the new entrepreneurial conservatives.  
 
There can be no doubt that the standard of living in rural China remains low, and that 
there are far from equal life chances between those living on and off the land and those 
living in towns and cities. Rural GDP per capita is about one quarter of urban GDP per 
capita and service provision—schools, clinics, hospitals—in the countryside is well 
below that in the towns and cities. Before the emergence of the Peasants Federation and 
its various locally and provincially organised groups, these differences were 
acknowledged but little action was forthcoming. Most of the central government’s 
                                                 
8 Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang’s’s Zhongguo guojia nengli baogao [A Report on China’s State 
Capacity] (1993) was published in English translation in two parts in Chinese Economic Studies (1995a; 
1995b); and Hu Angang, Wang Shaoguang and Kang Xiaoguang’s Zhongguo diqu chaju baogao [A 
Report on Regional Disparities in China] (1995), was also later published in English translation (Wang 
Shaoguang & Hu Angang 1999).  
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poverty alleviation went to nationally designated poverty counties rather than in 
programs to deliver specific benefits to rural areas.  
 
More determined action is still to occur but at least now there is fairly open debate about 
the need to amend the 1958 Household Registration Regulations. These are the 
regulations that effectively tie peasants to the land in perpetuity, by classifying them in 
terms of their rural household registration and by refusing peasant migrants (who move 
‘temporarily’ to towns and cities in search of work) the wider benefits of their own 
labour. The matter had been widely discussed during 2008-2009 in certain circles within 
China and a petition was submitted to the NPC on 25 March 2010 but without 
immediate result. As is often pointed out the Household Registration regulations 
essentially ensure a reserve pool of labour for the burgeoning capitalist sector while 
leaving those who travel for work unable to access urban benefits (especially health care 
and education) for themselves and their children, regardless of their residence. 
 
The issue of spatial inequality was first highlighted during the 1990s by those concerned 
about the impact of the Reform Era’s policies on the interior of the country away from 
the Eastern seaboard. In general, during the Mao-dominated years of China’s politics, 
each province and region was expected to be self-sufficient (Larsen 1992). The regional 
development policy introduced with the Reform Era in the early 1980s changed all this 
by requiring provinces, and indeed localities, to build on their competitive advantage. 
The result was that provinces with relatively easy access to the wealth and potential of 
the East Asian region prospered dramatically. By the mid-1990s GDP per capita in 
Guizhou, the poorest province, was only 8 percent of that in Shanghai, the wealthiest 
provincial-level jurisdiction.  
 
In 1999 the reports by Hu and Wang, and the public debate they generated, fed into the 
formulation of a new regional development policy to ‘Open Up the West,’ which largely 
failed to deliver the desired results (Goodman 2002). Few additional national resources 
were devoted to the West’s development, with instead an expectation that external (to 
the PRC) investment would fuel growth. Not least because locations in the West had 
poor infrastructure and communications with the rest of the country, let alone the rest of 
the world, foreign investors were understandably reluctant to become involved (Holdbig 
2004: 341).  
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Electoral reform has again placed the issue of the development of the interior provinces 
firmly on the agenda. This time support for investment in the interior provinces to 
support their economic growth comes from a usual alliance. One part of this support is 
the old left of the CCP. They have concerns about the inequalities that emerged with the 
policies of the last forty years. Moreover, they see a more balanced regional 
development strategy as a desirable end in itself, though few would prefer a return to 
Mao’s insistence on provincial self-reliance in case of invasion. The other support has 
come from the CDNCA. They see the opportunities for economic enterprise that may 
result if government support and resources are devoted to the development of the 
interior provinces.  
 
Referenda 
Two referenda have been scheduled to occur at the time of the 2020 general election. 
One is to consider a proposal for substantial autonomy of the Tibet Autonomous Region. 
The other is for the adoption of a federal constitution. There is little possibility that 
either will receive majority support. 
 
Tibet Autonomous Region 
The issue of autonomy for the Tibet Autonomous Region came to a referendum because 
of the deadlock that emerged at the Constituent Assembly. There was nothing like a 
majority at that meeting favouring greater autonomy in the Tibet Autonomous Region. 
The problem was that all but a handful of the delegates from the Tibet Autonomous 
Region were vociferous in their support for an autonomy vote, with debate being carried 
out in the full view of the world’s media. The solution was a national referendum, with 
a majority being required across China’s voters as a whole if greater autonomy is to be 
granted. One of the more interesting features of international law appears to be that a 
territory can join another jurisdiction on the basis of a decision in that territory alone;  
but that same territory cannot leave a jurisdiction of which it is part without the 
approval of the jurisdiction as a whole.9 
 
The battle lines for this referendum are fairly clearly drawn. On one side are the voters 
of the Tibet Autonomous Region who overwhelmingly favour greater autonomy. On the 
                                                 
9 This was the fate of Western Australia in 1933, which voted to leave the Commonwealth of Australia 
having joined only belatedly. In the event the Privy Council ruled the necessity of an all-Australia vote on 
the state’s secession, and this was never held.  
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other are almost all the other parties represented in the NPC. There is a view, 
spearheaded by a minority in the China Democratic League, that the Tibet Autonomous 
Region is a costly project to maintain and it should be left to its own devices. There are 
also some extreme nationalists in a number of parties who have tried to argue that total 
independence, if accepted and implemented, would be a good idea since the Tibetans 
are not ethnically Chinese.  
 
At the same time, the majority view seems to be that of the CCP. It has pointed out that 
even with greater autonomy the Tibet Autonomous Region is not economically viable. 
As a landlocked country with a poorly performing economy, it will be looking not 
simply for allies, but also for aid and assistance. There are basically two places that 
support could come from. One is China, and having just achieved greater autonomy, 
Tibet would be unlikely to approach China in that way, irrespective of China’s likely 
refusal. Moreover, China does currently provide aid and assistance, so that in the CCP’s 
view there is little need for the greater autonomy being proposed (Zhou 2011:60). 
Support could also come from the USA. However, that possible relationship might also 
entail US military bases being established in the eastern part of the Tibet Autonomous 
Region—anathema not only to the CCP but also to most Chinese.  
 
Federalism 
The issue of federalism is possibly more complex, though no more likely to lead to an 
acceptance. A referendum has been suggested by two political tendencies. One 
comprises the lawyers in the political parties, and particularly in the NPC, who argue 
that a federal system provides a superior system of checks and balances for a 
sophisticated modernised political system. It would also, of course, replace a single 
legal system with several systems at the federal and constituent state levels. The other 
consists of those in China who think that federalism will prove attractive to political 
forces on Taiwan and encourage them to consider reunification. These include, as might 
be expected, the Left Nationalists and the Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League. 
 
The prospects for a federal China are far from new elements in debates on public policy. 
Federalism was debated as a possible model in the early days of the Republic, and the 
CCP was initially a federal organisation (van de Ven 1992). By 1930 federalism had 
become equated with feudalism in contemporary Chinese political discourse and so it 
was unlikely to be regarded favourably by modernising nationalists (Fitzgerald 1998). 
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Economic federalism was easily embraced and implemented in the late 1970s and early 
1980s by the economic reformers (Montinola, Qian & Weingast 1995). There was some 
discussion of possible federal configurations for China’s political system at the same 
time (Zhao 1982), but these seem to have just disappeared like bamboo shoots without 
spring rain. 
 
The CCP remains opposed to political federalism on the grounds of practicality. 
Although it has embraced the project of direct elections, it has articulated concerns 
about another series of elections, which federalism would almost certainly necessitate, 
to a second chamber for the National People’s Congress. The CCP has also articulated 
fears that a federal political system might impede the work of government. It has 
pointed to its world’s best practice new superfast rail network as an example of what 
centralised government can achieve. As the CCP pointed out, both the USA and 
Australia barely have a long distance inter-city rail system let alone the latest generation 
bullet trains (The Economist 2010; Feng 2010). 
 
Election 2020 
At this distance even Directors of China Institutes would be hesitant to assay the results 
of the approaching election. After all, the element of uncertainty will have millions of 
Chinese viewers glued to the CCTV Election Night Tally Room broadcast. The CCP 
remains likely to be the dominant political party. At the same time, with the passage of 
time one would expect both the CDNCA and the Peasants Federation to increase both 
their share of the vote and their numbers of deputies in the NPC. There will, however, 
be much to appreciate, notwithstanding prominent politicians being voted out of office 
and high-profile celebrities being elected. Election night 2020 will make for great 
television. 
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Glossary of Chinese for terms used in the text 
 
China Association for Promoting Democracy 中国民主促进会 
China Democratic Leag 中国民主同盟 
China Democratic National Construction Association [CDNA] 中国民主建国会 
Chinese Communist Party [CCP] 中国共产党 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 中国人民政治协商会议 
Chinese Peasants and Workers Democratic Party 中国农工民主党 
China Public Dedication Party 中国致公党 
Housing estate 社区 
Household registration 户口 
Left Nationalist Party 中国国民党革命委员会 
National People’s Congress 全国人民代表大会 
September 3 Society 九三学社 
Social unit 单位 
Sturm und Drang 风雨 
Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League 台湾民主自治同盟 
Three Represents 三个代表 
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